

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 233069

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, KS, JA

SUBJECT: FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES KOREAN ITEM IN UN

1. SUMMARY. CHIEF OF UN SECTION IN JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE OKAWA CALLED ON ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY BLAKE (IO) SEPTEMBER 29 TO DISCUSS KOREAN ITEM AT UN. OKAWA WAS IN NEW YORK TO CONSULT WITH JAPANESE MISSION THERE AND RETURNS TO TOKYO SEPTEMBER 30 WHERE HE EXPECTS TO FACE INTERPELATION IN DIET. OKAWA WAS PESSIMISTIC OVER CHANCES FOR US-ROK SPONSORED RESOLUTION. HE WAS CONCERNED OVER EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF ALGERIAN RESOLUTION ON PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN KOREA AND HE PROBED REPEATEDLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECRETARY'S PROPOSALS FOR CONFERENCE ON KOREA IN HIS SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH FORESHADOWED ROLE FOR JAPAN. END SUMMARY.

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2. ASSESSMENT OF US-ROK SPONSORED RESOLUTION. OKAWA MADE CLEAR THAT JAPANESE WERE VERY PESSIMISTIC AS TO CHANCES FOR SUCCESS FOR US-ROK SPONSORED RESOLUTION. HE QUESTIONED TACTIC OF ACCEPTING FRENCH AMENDMENTS TO

RESOLUTION AT THIS STAGE. HE THOUGHT FRENCH AMENDMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN KEPT AS SEPARATE RESOLUTION FOR INTRODUCTION LATER IN SESSION. HE DID NOT THINK AMENDMENTS WOULD BRING IN MANY VOTES, DOUBTED VALUE OF FRENCH

COSPONSORSHIP, AND CONCLUDED THAT TACTICAL SITUATION HAD WEAKENED. HE BELIEVED AT THIS STAGE IT WAS FAR MORE IMPORTANT TO GAIN POSITIVE VOTES FOR ENDANGERED FRIENDLY RESOLUTION THAN TO OBTAIN COSPONSORS AND NOTED THAT JAPANESE LOBBYING CONCENTRATED ON EXPLAINING FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. HE SAID HIS VIEWS WERE SHARED BY ROK FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG JO AND THAT JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MIAZAWA HAD TALKED ALONG THE SAME LINES TO SECRETARY.

3. OKAWA LAID GREAT STRESS ON PLANS OF ASEAN GROUP ON KOREA, SAYING THOSE COUNTRIES WERE MEETING IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 29 POSSIBLY WITH INTENTION OF DRAFTING THEIR OWN RESOLUTION. HE NOTED THAT PHILIPPINES WERE EXTREMELY DISSATISFIED WITH PRESENT RESOLUTION BELIEVING THAT ITS EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO CHANGES IN FUTURE WAS MISPLACED. HE ALSO NOTED IN PASSING THAT JAPAN THOUGHT IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD SUPPORT FRIENDLY RESOLUTION.

4. OKAWA SAID THAT THE JAPANESE UN MISSION BELIEVES THAT FRIENDLY RESOLUTION MAY LOSE BY AS MANY AS TEN VOTES. HE TERMED UNFORTUNATE FACT THAT FIRST COMMITTEE WOULD BE DISCUSSING AGENDA PRIORITIES AT SAME TIME SECURITY COUNCIL WAS MEETING ON VIETNAM MEMBERSHIP. HE DISCOUNTED VIEWS THAT WE COULD WIN ON PRIORITY ISSUE IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE, SAYING JAPANESE VIEW WAS THAT WE WOULD LOSE BY NARROW MARGIN.

5. BLAKE EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE THAT JAPANESE VOTE ESTIMATES WERE SO DIFFERENT FROM THOSE REPORTED BY CONFIDENTIAL

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CORE GROUP COSPONSORS. HE SUGGESTED THE URGENCY OF JAPANESE UN MISSION CONSULTING WITH USUN TO SEE WHERE THE DIFFERENCES IN ESTIMATES LIE AND OF TARGETING FURTHER US AND JAPANESE DEMARCHES WHERE WEAKNESSES EXIST. HE STATED US VIEW WAS THAT OUTLOOK FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WAS REASONABLY FAVORABLE. SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE AND FRENCH AMENDMENTS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. HE NOTED THAT WHILE THERE WAS ROOM FOR DIFFERENCE OF VIEW ON TIMING OF FRENCH AMENDMENTS THEY IN FACT HAD GIVEN US VERY LITTLE CHOICE BY MAKING THEM KNOWN TO EC-9 AT SAME TIME CORE SPONSORS WERE INFORMED- US TACTICS ARE FOCUSED ON OBTAINING DEFEAT OF ALGERIAL RESOLUTION

AND FRENCH AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE HELPFUL IN MOVING VOTES INTO "ABSTENTION" AND "NO" CATEGORIES. FRENCH HAVE BEEN ONLY MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED NATION TO HOLD BACK ON COSPONSORING AND WE CONSIDERED FRENCH COSPONSORSHIP

AND INFLUENCE IT WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERT IMPORTANT. ON THE QUESTION OF ASEAN RESOLUTION, BLAKE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY PREMATURE FOR ASEAN STATES TO TABLE A TEXT AT THIS TIME AND SUGGESTED THAT OUR MISSIONS IN NEW YORK BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM TO MAKE THIS POINT.

6. DIET INTERPELLATION. OKAWA SAID HE EXPECTED INTENSE QUESTIONING IN DIET ON KOREA WHEN HE RETURNED TO TOKYO. HE ALSO WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT LINES QUESTIONING WOULD TAKE AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW IN PESSIMISTIC VEIN THAT BOTH SAITO AND MIAZAWA HAD TAKEN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO.

7. BLAKE RESPONDED THAT WHILE ONE SHOULD BE REALISTIC IN VIEWS PROPOUNDED TO THE DIET AND THE PRESS, OVER-PESSIMISM COULD BE DANGEROUS AND SET IN TRAIN THE VERY TREND WE SOUGHT TO AVOID BY MAKING FENCE SITTERS MOVE TO HOSTILE CAMP. HE THOUGHT OUR POSITION WAS MODERATELY STRONG AND THAT IT WAS THIS VIEW THAT SHOULD BE PROJECTED VIGOROUSLY AND CONFIDENTLY ON OUTSIDE.

8. TERMINATION OF UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC). OKAWA SAID PRINCIPAL REASON HE CAME TO WASHINGTON WAS TO CONFIDENTIAL

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SEEK OUR VIEWS ON PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING UNC. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS THEORETICAL QUESTION BUT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN DIET AND HE DID NOT WANT TO SAY ANYTHING THAT MIGHT BE CONTRADICTED BY US AT LATER DATE. ENSUING CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS DIFFUSE BUT FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR POINTS IN JAPANESE PRESENTATION:

(A) SOME IN JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY HELD THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS RESIDUAL AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO UNC. WE SHOULD NOT COMPLETELY SEPARATE COMMAND FROM THIS SECURITY COUNCIL LINK BY ARGUING THAT TERMINATION OF UNC IS SIMPLY A MATTER FOR DECISION BY US. OPPOSITION PARTIES IN JAPAN WOULD ARGUE THAT IF TERMINATION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY US THEN IT SHOULD DO SO FORTHWITH.

(B) HOWEVER, OKAWA PREFERRED TO LEAVE AMBIGUOUS FOR TIME BEING SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE.

(C) OKAWA WAS CONCERNED THAT RESOLUTION CRITICAL OF PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE PASSED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE NOTED THAT JAPANESE HAD NOT CONSIDERED

A SITUATION WHERE BOTH RESOLUTIONS WOULD PASS AND
INTIMATED THAT THEY WERE NOT REALLY CONSIDERING SITUATION
WHERE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WOULD PASS AND ALGERIAN

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RESOLUTION BE DEFEATED. IN CASE OF PASSAGE OF SUCH A
RESOLUTION WE MIGHT WANT TO HAVE SAFEGUARDS WHICH
SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE UNC COULD PROVIDE.
WHILE HE DID NOT STATE SO EXPLICITLY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT
OKAWA WAS CONCERNED THAT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
CONDEMNING PRESENCE OF US FORCES WOULD IN SOME WAY
PLACE STATUS OF THOSE FORCES UNDER PRESSURE AND HE WAS
LOOKING FOR SOME DEVICE WHERE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION
MIGHT COMPENSATE FOR THIS.

(D) HE QUESTIONED BLAKE VERY CLOSELY ABOUT THE
COMPOSITION OF UNC AND ON STATEMENTS WHICH BLAKE MADE
ABOUT US VIEW ON TERMINATION.

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9. IN DISCUSSING TERMINATION OF THE UNC BLAKE MADE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAVE NEVER BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
ON UNC TERMINATION. IT HAS NOT BEEN RAISED IN PRESS OR
CONGRESS HERE. HOW WE WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM
WOULD PROBABLY DEPEND ON TYPE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH
QUESTION AROSE. IF A QUESTION ARISES IN THE DIET, WE
WOULD HOPE THAT JAPAN WOULD CONSULT WITH US ON ANSWERS
TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT THEY MIGHT FIND DIFFICULT.

(B) FOR THE MOMENT, THE BEST EXPRESSION OF OUR VIEWS
IS THAT UNDER RESOLUTION 84, UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ESTABLISHED UNIFIED COMMAND IN KOREA UNDER US AND
ASKED US TO DESIGNATE ITS COMMANDER. IT WAS OUR VIEW
THAT WE COULD RESIGN COMMAND WITHOUT ANY ACTION BEING
REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL. IN ANSWER TO SERIES
OF PROBING QUESTIONS, BLAKE SAID THAT THEORETICALLY
THERE MIGHT BE A QUESTION AFTER THE RESIGNATION OF A
US COMMANDER AS TO WHETHER UNIFIED COMMAND ITSELF
CONTINUED TO EXIST BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE THIS AS
PRACTICAL PROBLEM. THERE WOULD BE NO COMMANDER AND NO
FORCES. DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MIGHT WANT TO
REPORT OUR ACTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(C) OKAWA ASKED WHETHER IN THE US VIEW UN SECURITY
COUNCIL SHOULD MEET IF THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION PASSED.
BLAKE RESPONDED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON UNC. BOTH PRC AND USSR
STRONGLY OPPOSE A SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE IN KOREA. HE
THEN ASKED IF OKAWA COULD IMAGINE SITUATIONS WHERE IT

WOULD BE IN OUR JOINT INTEREST TO HAVE ISSUE RAISED
IN SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS THEN THAT OKAWA MADE MENTION
OF HIS FEARS ABOUT EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF ALGERIAN
RESOLUTION ON US FORCES MENTIONED ABOVE.

10. SECRETARY'S SPEECH. OKAWA PROBED VERY CAREFULLY
ABOUT THE CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY IN HIS
SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH. HE ASKED WHETHER THE PROPOSED
MEETINGS OF PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE INCLUDED THE ROK
AND WAS AGAIN ASSURED THAT IT DID. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER
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THE LARGER CONFERENCE WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS
FIRST MEETING WOULD INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN.
HE NOTED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD POSE GREAT PROBLEMS
FOR JAPAN AND THAT HE HOPED NO ONE WOULD THINK THAT
JAPAN WAS SEEKING AN INVITATION. HE NOTED ALSO THAT
THE KOREANS WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH JAPANESE PARTICIPA-
TION. BLAKE SAID WE RECOGNIZED PROBLEMS WHICH PARTICIPA-
TION IN SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD CAUSE FOR JAPAN. ASKED
WHAT THE RECIPROCAL MEASURES WERE WHICH WERE REFERRED TO
IN THE SPEECH, BLAKE REPLIED THAT THE KIND OF RECIPROCAL
MEASURES WE HAD IN MIND INCLUDED SUCH THINGS AS RECOGNI-
TION OF THE ROK BY THE PRC WHICH MIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE
RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA. HE STRESSED THAT
THE KEY WAS RECIPROCITY. OKAWA ASKED WHETHER THE
SECRETARY WAS PROPOSING MODIFICATION OF THE ARMISTICE.
BLAKE REPLIED THAT

- WE WERE SPEAKING ABOUT A WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE
THE UNC WHILE PRESERVING THE ARMISTICE.

11. OKAWA CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION ON KOREA BY WARNING
THAT WE SHOULD EXPECT SOME INITIATIVE BY BAROODY (SAUDI
ARABIAN REPRESENTATIVE).

12. COMMENT. AS IS CLEAR FROM THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS
OKAWA WAS GREATLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE
KOREAN ITEM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WHETHER HIS OUTLOOK
WAS SIMPLY A REFLECTION OF THE SIMILAR VIEWS ALREADY
EXPRESSED BY FONMIN MIAZAWA AND PERMREP SAITO OR WAS
CAUSED BY OTHER FACTORS IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY. OUR CONCERN
IS THAT THIS PESSIMISTIC FRAME OF MIND WILL MAKE THEM
SUSCEPTIBLE TO PREMATURE PROPOSALS FOR COMPROMISE AND
WEAKEN THEIR LOBBYING EFFORTS.

13. FOR USUN. REQUEST YOU CONSULT WITH JAPAN UN
MISSION ON VOTE ESTIMATES TO DETERMINE CAUSE FOR
DIFFERENCE IN VIEW AND IN CONSULTATION WITH JAPANESE
MISSION SEEK TO DETERMINE INTENTIONS OF ASEAN GROUP
ON INTRODUCTION OF NEW RESOLUTION. INGERSOLL

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